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"ONE, No ONE AND ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND" . . .
WHICH ETHICAL RULE TO APPLY? CONFLICT OF
ETHICAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Nathan M. Crystal* & Francesca Giannoni-Crystal**
I. INTRODUCTION
The ABA Ethics 20/20 commission was charged with examining and
making recommendations for additions or changes to the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to reflect the impact of technology and
globalization on the practice of law.2 The commission has finished with its
work, but it has failed to act on a significant problem that has emerged
from the globalization of law practice: determination of the ethical rules
that apply in international commercial arbitration ("ICA").3
Part II of this paper argues that uncertainty about these rules, coupled
with growing instances of unethical conduct in ICA, is a substantial threat
to the legitimacy of ICA. We argue that the situation for lawyers engaged
in ICA ("ICA Lawyers") is similar to the state of the American legal pro-
fession before Watergate, which was characterized by lack of clear gui-
dance to lawyers.
* Nathan Crystal is both a practicing lawyer and professor of law who has been teaching,
writing, and consulting in the fields of contract law and professional ethics for more than forty years. He
is the author of four books and numerous articles on ethics and contract law, both domestically and
internationally. Professor Crystal has lectured internationally in Italy, Australia, and China. He is
admitted to practice in New York, Georgia, and South Carolina. He is also an ethics advisor for major
law firms and serves as expert witness in complex and high-stakes litigation.
** Ms. Francesca Giannoni-Crystal is a duly qualified U.S. and Italian attorney. She is admitted
as an avvocato in Italy, as an attorney in both New York and the District of Columbia, and while not a
member of the South Carolina bar, she is certified as a foreign legal consultant in South Carolina. She
has multiple publications in the fields of contracts and legal ethics. Her practice has focused on
transactional work, particularly international and technological contracts and corporate matters.
The authors are the founding members of Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, LLC with offices in
Charleston, New York, and Washington D.C.
1. LuiI PIRANDELLO, UNO, NESSUNO E CENTOMILA (1926).
2. Indeed, when ABA President Caroline Lamm created the Ethics 20/20 Commission in 2009,
she said:
Technological advances and globalization have changed our profession in ways not yet re-
flected in our ethics codes and regulatory structure. Technologies such as e-mail, the Internet
and smart phones are transforming the way we practice law and our relationships with clients,
just as they have compressed our world and expanded international business opportunities for
our clients.
American Bar Association, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Commission to Address
Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing U.S. Lawyers http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/
media/release/newsjrelease.cfm?releaseid=730 (August 4, 2009) (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
3. We use this acronym as a shorthand reference to international arbitration as distinguished
from domestic arbitration and state-to-state arbitration. Under this acronym we include international
investment arbitration, which-if not technically commercial-is affected by the same uncertainty of
the ethics rules applicable to the counsel involved.
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Part III discusses two major ethical challenges facing ICA Lawyers:
"double deontology" (i.e., when the same lawyer is bound by two conflict-
ing sets of ethics rules) and "inequality-of-arms" (i.e., when in the same
proceeding, lawyers are bound by different ethics rules resulting in one side
having an advantage in the arbitration.) This section provides specific ex-
amples of divergences in ethics rules illustrating these challenges (witness
preparation, communications with clients, and relationship among fellow
lawyers).
Part IV begins by summarizing five theoretical ways in which the ap-
plicable set of ethics rules could be identified in cross-border transactions.
We then consider possible application of these approaches to ICA: use of
national standards, use of host country standards, and use of a conflict of
law approach as in ABA Model Rule 8.5. This section concludes with a
discussion of the preparation of a special code of ethics for international
lawyers. While we agree that such a code would be desirable, we doubt
that one could be agreed upon by the relevant interest groups at all, and
certainly not within the foreseeable future. The drafting history of the
Code of Conduct for European Lawyers (CCBE) provides support for our
skepticism. While the Code has been widely adopted throughout Europe,
it fails to provide clear guidance to lawyers about their obligations when
dealing with conflicting ethics rules of various countries.
Part V offers a practical proposal to increase certainty and uniformity
in ethical obligations of ICA Lawyers. Our approach, which we call "con-
tractarian," is based on the principle that the basis and legitimacy of arbi-
tration flows from the agreement of the parties. Therefore, to us it makes
sense for the ethical rules that apply to ICA Lawyers to be based on the
intention of the parties, as evidenced by an express clause in their agree-
ment or implied by certain choices that the parties have made. More spe-
cifically, below we offer the following rules for determining the set of
ethical rules that ICA Lawyers should adhere to.
1. The parties may choose the ethics rule applicable to the
ICA Lawyers in the proceeding, exactly as they may choose
the governing law. Parties are allowed to choose the rules
of evidence and procedure applicable in their arbitration;
therefore, they should also be allowed to choose the ethics
rules.
2. In the absence of selection by the parties of a specific
set of ethics rules to govern the arbitration, if the arbitration
agreement selects an arbitration provider that has adopted a
set of ethical rules, then those rules should apply to the
arbitration.
3. If the provider chosen by the agreement has not
adopted a set of ethics rules or if no provider is chosen, but
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the agreement contains a choice of law clause, then the eth-
ics rules that apply should be the ethics rules of the jurisdic-
tion whose law was chosen. If the agreement provides for
the law of several jurisdictions, then the ethics rules of the
jurisdiction whose law governs the predominant number of
issues in the case should apply.
4. If neither 1, 2, or 3 governs the situation, then the ethics
rules that apply should be the rules of the jurisdiction whose
law controls the predominant number of issues in the case
as determined by the arbitrators using conflict of law
principles.
5. In any case not covered by the first four principles (e.g.,
when the parties have agreed that the arbitration should be
decided by general mercantile law or UNIDROIT principles
or similar references) or in cases not covered by the relevant
body of ethics rules, the necessary ethics rules should be de-
termined by the arbitrators, either by general order adopt-
ing a set of ethics standards or by order dealing with specific
issues either on motion of either party or on the arbitrators'
own motion. Arbitrators should select a reasonable set of
rules, either followed in a jurisdiction, adopted by a reputa-
ble international organization, or advocated by a scholar.
6. Once a set of ethics rules is identified pursuant to this
"contractarian" method, the domestic ethics rules different
from the identified set of rules should not be applicable to
ICA Lawyers. An ICA Lawyer who complied with the rules
so identified should not be sanctioned for violation of an
ethics rule of the jurisdiction in which he or she is admitted,
when there is no violation of the identified set of rules.
The ABA Ethics 20/20 commission should have modified Rule 8.5 (or
added a comment to it) in order to clarify which set of ethics rules applies
to ICA Lawyers and to make clear that once ICA Lawyers comply with the
identified set of rules, no sanction for violation of the ethics rules of their
jurisdiction of admission is allowed. However, despite this lack of specific
guidance from the ABA, Part VI argues that the "contractarian" approach
is consistent with the current version of ABA Model Rule 8.5. We also
argue that disciplinary authorities should, as a matter of comity to interna-
tional arbitration, not entertain disciplinary actions against ICA Lawyers
when the latter adhere to contractually agreed ethics rules applicable to
ICA.
The approach that we suggest provides a substantial degree of uni-
formity and certainty to the ethical obligations of ICA Lawyers. Moreover,
it provides a path for the development of an international code of ethics
like that favored by many scholars because it results in the adoption of
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rules of ethics to govern ICA proceedings, thus creating a body of experi-
ence that can help refine codes. Although the ABA 20/20 Commission has
completed its work, the problem of determining the applicable set of ethics
rules for ICA Lawyers remains. The issue can still be raised by other bod-
ies of the ABA, such as the Sections of International Law or Litigation. In
the concluding section of the article (Part VII), we offer a modest addition
to comment 7 to Model Rule 8.5 as a way in which the problem facing ICA
Lawyers could be handled.
Lastly, we will provide an explanation for the title of this paper. The
title comes from a question that we have asked ourselves: Must we resign
ourselves to accept that the ethics rules applicable to ICA Lawyers are like
the personal and psychological features of the main character of
Pirandello's One, No one and One Hundred Thousand, i.e. once we recog-
nize that differences exist, it becomes impossible to establish unity? It is
our opinion that we should not. While waiting for an international code for
ICA Lawyers, which we hope will arrive, but may not, the answer is: par-
ties' agreement.
II. Do WE NEED ETHICS RULES FOR COUNSEL IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION?
Should the conduct of ICA Lawyers be regulated at all or should we
simply rely on unwritten rules of their fraternity? Indeed, when talking of
the need to clarify ethics rules for ICA Lawyers, we sometimes encounter a
skeptical approach that can be synthesized into: "Why do we need clarifica-
tion? ICA Lawyers know how to behave." The objection is not meritless
because the international arbitration bar has the reputation of being a
"quite civilized and ethical bar."4
It used to be case that ICA was a niche way to resolve controversies.
Before the U.S. accessed the New York Arbitration Convention in 1970,
ICA was very European-and civil law-dominated, particularly by
France-because of the location of the International Chamber of Com-
merce.5 Attention to the significance for international arbitration of differ-
ences among ethical regimes is indeed quite recent. In the past, issues such
as witness preparation and cross-examination tended to be viewed through
the lens of a clash of legal cultures.6 Lawyers resolved these cultural differ-
ences by "gentlemen's agreement" rather than legal resolution.
ICA is not a niche anymore; rather it has become the preferred way to
solve international disputes, many of which involve hundreds of millions, if
4. Edna Sussman & Solomon Ebere, All's Fair in Love and War-Or is it? Reflections on Ethi-
cal Standards for Counsel in International Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 611, 612 (2011).
5. See George M. von Mehren & Alana C. Jochum, Is International Arbitration Becoming Too
American?, 2 GLOBAL Bus. L. REv. 47, 49-52 (2011).
6. Correspondence and conversation (during 2012 and 2013) with Bette Shifman, Vice Presi-
dent, Director of Publications & Special Counsel, CPR International Institute for Conflict Prevention
& Resolution. We thank Bette Shifman for sharing with us these interesting insights.
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not billions of dollars. In this context "gentlemen's agreements" are insuf-
ficient. In 2011, the International Bar Association's Arbitration Commit-
tee issued a survey regarding counsel ethics ("IBA Survey").7 The answers
to the Survey revealed many examples of abuses by ICA Lawyers that have
been characterized as "guerrilla warfare."' We think that the lack of clarity
of the rules (coupled with the increase of the number and significance of
ICA) is likely to be responsible for the deterioration of conduct.
We see an analogy between the ethical situation governing ICA and
the lack of clarity of ethics rules governing attorneys before the Watergate
scandal.' John W. Dean III, President Nixon's White House counsel, was
characterized by the FBI as the "master manipulator of the Watergate
cover-up."'o In the summer of 1971 Egil "Bud" Krogh Jr., a deputy assis-
tant to the President, was given the responsibility to head a special investi-
gations unit, the "Plumbers," whose role was to "plug" news leaks."
Among members of the Plumbers were the organizers of the Watergate
break-in. Dean and Krogh were disbarred for their roles in Watergate.
Both Dean and Krogh lamented the obscurity of the rules of ethics
and the fact that the existing rules were not well known. Krogh stated:
"[i]n law school, I took this curious course on ethics. But there was nothing
about conflicts or the role of lawyers. We were in completely unknown
territory. I was completely unprepared."12 Similarly, Dean declared:
In 1972, legal ethics boiled down to don't lie, don't cheat,
don't steal and don't advertise .... When I took the elective
course in ethics at law school, it was one-quarter of a credit.
Legal ethics and professionalism played almost no role in
any lawyer's mind, including mine. Watergate changed
that-for me and every other lawyer.1 3
Because of the "discredited lawyers who figured so prominently
among the Watergate villains," public opinion of the legal profession de-
clined.1 4 In response to this situation, the American Bar Association be-
came much more active in proposing ethical standards, including
mandatory ethical instruction in law schools and revisions of the governing
rules of professional conduct. In 1983 the ABA adopted the Model Rules
7. Sussman & Ebere, supra note 4, at 611.
8. Id. at 612.
9. Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate: How a '3rd-Rate Burglary' Provoked New Stan-






14. Marc Galanter, The Faces Of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers In Public Opinion, Jokes, and
Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805, 812 (1998).
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of Professional Conduct to replace the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility."
As we said the "international arbitration bar" is still perceived to be a
"quite civilized and ethical bar,"16 but instances of ethical abuses are be-
coming more common among ICA Lawyers. Edna Sussman and Solomon
Ebere summarized the IBA Survey. They reported that the 68% of the 81
participants answered that they felt to have been the victim of or witnessed
one or more than one situations of "guerrilla tactics.""
More than the number of the violations (which are small if we consider
the number of ICA proceedings), the types of reported misconduct18 are of
greater concern. The examples are numerous:
* improper behavior in discovery (such as distributing the pages of a
requested document in 18 different boxes);
* lying about counsel's or a party's health to delay a hearing;
* changing counsel for the only purpose of creating a conflict with
the arbitrator;
* frivolous challenges to the arbitrator to delay proceeding;
* sending inflammatory letters to arbitrators;
* last minute introduction of evidence;
* initiation of criminal or bankruptcy proceedings against opposing
counsel;
* threats to arbitrators that they would face contempt actions if they
started arbitration proceedings (and other cases of ex parte
communication);
* threats to witness favorable to the other side ("he would never
work again");
* filing of disciplinary complaints against every expert that the other
side plans to present;
* hyper-aggressive behavior against the arbitrators who did not rule
favorably;
* pretending to present documents to scare witnesses when in fact
the "documents" were only blank paper;
* exhibiting boxes of documents that the attorney claimed to be
favorable when the boxes were actually empty;
* confusing and insulting witnesses by calling them "liars";
* insisting on having supporting documentation but never presenting
it.19
Moreover, the use of guerrilla tactics appears to be increasing.2 0
15. Curriden, supra note 9.
16. Sussman & Ebere, supra note 4, at 612.
17. Id. at 613.
18. Id. at 613-15.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 613.
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While it might be true that similar abuses occur in litigation,21 that is
an insufficient response to the problem in ICA for two reasons. First, arbi-
tration finds its legitimacy in the agreement of the parties. The parties
choose to entrust the resolution of their controversies to arbitration instead
of taking them to a court of justice. If parties begin to think that ICA
proceedings are infected with unethical conduct, they may not feel com-
fortable in having their cases decided through ICA. ICA proceedings re-
quire higher ethical conduct than traditional litigation to maintain their
legitimacy. Professor Catherine Rogers, one of the leading scholars on
ICA, has this to say about "legitimacy:"
[A] number of leading arbitrators and practitioners have de-
scribed the current situation [i.e. the ethical aspects of inter-
national arbitration] as a crisis that can threaten the
legitimacy of international arbitration and in need of imme-
diate redress.22
Second, a vacuum in regulation exists. While the national bar authori-
ties have done very little to regulate or sanction the ethical conduct of law-
yers in ICA, at the same time major international arbitrators have failed to
give lawyers involved in ICA any guidance.23 Without regulation and gui-
dance, the potential for a Watergate-like situation is present.
III. SOME EXAMPLES OF CLASHES BETWEEN ETHICS RULES
National ethics rules differ greatly and so do their "conflict of ethics
rules,"2 4 especially between civil law and common law countries. If there
are professionals who have not focused on how different the ethics and
conflicts rules are, then these professionals may one day have an experi-
ence similar to that of Mr. Moscarda-the main character of Pirandello's
novel, One, No One and One Hundred Thousand-who until the age of
twenty-eight had never noticed that his nose was tilted to one side, instead
of being straight as he always thought it was." After this sudden discovery
21. Id. at 612.
22. Catherine A. Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration: Introduction and Chapter One (Ox-
ford University Press Accepted Paper Series), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016290, at 5.
23. Sussman & Ebere, supra note 4, at 616 ("[M]ajor international arbitration providers are si-
lent as to the question of ethics for counsel").
24. By "conflict of ethics rules" we mean the rules that identify which set of ethical rules apply to
lawyers in different situations. In the U.S., the principal conflict of ethics rule is Model Rule 8.5.
25. PIRANDELLO, supra note 1, at 13.
"What are you doing?" my wife asked, seeing me linger, unusually, in front of the mirror.
"Nothing," I replied. "Just looking at myself, at my nose, here, inside this nostril. When I
press it, I feel a little pain."
My wife smiled and said: "I thought you were looking to see which way it tilts."
I wheeled around like a dog whose tail has been stepped on.
"Tilts? My nose?"
And my wife said, serenely: "Of course, dear. Take a good look. It tilts to the right."
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Moscarda loses completely the perception of his own identity and ends his
days in an asylum:
I believed everyone saw me as a Moscarda with a straight
nose, whereas everyone saw a Moscarda with a bent
nose . .. I was obsessed by the thought that for others I was
not what till now, privately, I had imagined myself to be. . . .
[W]ith the discovery of the hundreds thousand Moscardas
that I was, not only for the others but also for myself, all
with this one name of Moscarda . . . all inside this poor
body of mine that was also one and, alas, no one, if I set
myself before the mirror and looked . . . into my eyes ... 26
Before considering some examples of differences among ethics rules,
we will examine the consequences that derive from the differences.
A. Why Differences Matter: "Double Deontology" and
"Inequality of Arms" Issues
Generally lawyers are bound by the ethics rules of the jurisdictions in
which they are admitted to practice or where they practice. When a lawyer
engages in an international arbitration, the arbitration may be related to a
number of countries other than the lawyer's home country.2 7 For example,
the arbitration provider may be located in France, the arbitration panel
may hear the matter in Argentina, and the parties may come from Brazil
and Mexico. In this situation, the lawyers may become subject to the ethics
rules of more than one jurisdiction. In addition, different lawyers in the
same proceedings might be bound by different sets of rules.
Two types of problems arise from differences in ethical standards of
lawyers involved in ICA: "double deontology" 28  and "inequality-of-
arms." 29
The "double deontology" problem occurs when a lawyer is admitted to
practice in two different jurisdictions or when he is licensed in one jurisdic-
tion but appears in another. If the relevant jurisdictions have conflicting
I was twenty-eight years old, and until then I has always considered my nose-if not actually
handsome-at least quite decent, like all the other parts of my person generally.
Id.
26. Id. at 6-7.
27. Multijurisdictional practice has been a reality in the United States for many years. The fact
of such practice generated two types of ethical problems. First, lawyers who practiced across state lines
without being admitted to practice in all of the jurisdictions in which they provided services ran the risk
that they were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The ABA and most states have attempted
to deal with this problem by Model Rule 5.5. Second, even if the lawyers were admitted in all of the
relevant jurisdictions, either by regular admission or pro hac vice, the lawyers faced possible uncer-
tainty or conflicts between the rules of the relevant jurisdictions. Model Rule 8.5 attempts to deal with
this problem.
28. Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics Of Advocacy In International Arbitration 5 (Penn State
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1559012 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
29. Id.
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rules, then "the attorney is faced with the prospect of professional disci-
pline regardless of what actions he takes."30 Notice that the "double deon-
tology" problem is not peculiar to international arbitration; it may also
occur in domestic practice when lawyers-because admitted in two differ-
ent jurisdictions or anyway subject to the ethical rules of two jurisdic-
tions-are bound by ethics requirements that are inconsistent with one
another.
The "double deontology" problem has been widely analyzed by schol-
ars, among others by Matthew T. Nagel, who defined the problem as
"[p]erhaps the most confusing issue confronting lawyers in transnational
practice." It is a problem of potential disciplinary sanctions and most of
all of lack of guidance:
Double deontology describes the situation where someone
is obligated to simultaneously follow two different sets of
ethical standards, and often, the two standards conflict on
some issue ... Absent any international ethical organization
with binding authority to license and guide lawyers, a lawyer
who practices outside of his licensed jurisdiction is likely to
encounter a different ethical code. The lawyer has a duty to
follow this new code, as well as the code in his home juris-
diction, and he is subject to discipline under both codes.3 2
A lawyer who is without any guidance, could use in the abstract "four
standards":
(1) his own moral standard;
(2) the standard in the ethical code of the nation whose dis-
cipline he is definitely subject to (Home State);
(3) the code of the state in which he is rendering services
(Host State); or
(4) some third party's code of conduct.33
The "inequality-of-arms" (or "unlevel playing field") problem occurs
"when attorneys who are bound by different ethical rules participate in a
30. Id.
31. Perhaps the most confusing issue confronting lawyers in transnational practice is the conflict-
ing rules of ethical conduct that dictate pratitioners' [sic practitioners] conduct whenever they cross a
national border. In addition to significant communication and logistical issues, these ethical rules bind
lawyers regardless of whether they know or have studied the rules pertinent to every county repre-
sented in a given situation. As such, many lawyers feel there is little guidance on how to handle the
differences in ethical rules. Specifically, lawyers can potentially face disciplinary action both at home
and abroad, creating a serious problem called double deontology.
Matthew T. Nagel, Double Deontology and the CCBE: Harmonizing the Double Trouble in Europe, 6
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 455, 456 (2007).
32. Id. at 459.
33. Id. at 472.
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single international proceeding" and because of those differences the pro-
ceeding may be "structurally unfair." 34 For example, one counsel may be
free to communicate ex parte with the arbitrators, while another cannot do
so because the ethics rules of that lawyer's jurisdiction prohibit such con-
tacts, which is the typical situation for American lawyers.
If the disciplinary authorities do not discipline lawyers engaged in ICA
for conduct that violates national rules, the playing field may be leveled by
desuetude, but lawyers who violate their local rules would always be at risk
that the disciplinary authorities may change their enforcement policies. If
the bar authorities do begin to discipline lawyers for conduct in ICA that is
permitted for lawyers in other countries, some clients may begin to avoid
ICA (or avoid hiring lawyers subject to stringent ethical requirements) be-
cause the clients would fear that they would be at a disadvantage in ICA.
In addition, reliance on lack of enforcement does not help lawyers who
treat their ethical obligations as a personal responsibility.
B. Some Examples of Divergences in Ethics Rules
There are substantial differences in ethics rules that can be relevant
from the perspective of both "double deontology" and "inequality-of-
arms."3 5 We focus on three examples of ethical disagreement.
1. Divergence in the Rules Regarding Witness Preparation3 6
The "clash between national ethical rules relating to pre-testimonial
contact with [the] witness" is "the seminal and most familiar example used
to illustrate the need for international ethical rules."" It is true that move-
ment toward allowing ICA Lawyers to contact and prepare witnesses for
testimony seems to be developing." For example, Article 4(3) of the Inter-
national Bar Association (IBA) Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Inter-
national Arbitration (which are often adopted in international arbitrations)
provides that "it shall not be improper for a Party, its officers, legal advisors
or other representatives to interview its witnesses or potential witnesses" and
34. Nagel, supra note 31, at 6.
35. Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Attorney Con-
duct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341, 357-73 (2002).
36. By witness preparation we intend the "method used by a lawyer to discuss the witness's
actual testimony prior to their testimony." Roberta K. Flowers, What You See is What You Get: Apply-
ing the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REV. 699, 740 n. 287 (1998). See
generally Roberta K. Flowers, Witness Preparation: Regulating the Profession's Dirty "Little Secret," 38
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1007 (2011). Witness preparation is distinguished from the "improper witness
manipulation and intimidation-sometimes called witness 'coaching'." Id. at 1009. "Witness coaching"
is improper, as stated in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 81, 87 (1976) (holding that a lawyer is
prohibited from influencing a witness, but not providing a definition of "improper influence"). Flowers,
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.. at. 1010. For a discussion of the difference between witness preparation and
improper coaching, see id. at 1011-16.
37. Rogers, supra note 28, at 3.
38. Ian Meredith & Hussain Khan, Commentary, Witness Preparation in International Arbitra-
tion - A Cross Cultural Minefield, reprinted in 26 MEALY'S INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REPORT 9,
1-2 (2011) (discussing institutional rules and guidelines).
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to discuss their prospective testimony with them. 3 9 However, the IBA does
not regulate lawyers; national courts and organizations do, and national
standards are still controlling, even if national authorities might not be
sanctioning ICA Lawyers for witness preparation. Ian Meredith and Hus-
sain Khan stated the following in their commentary:
Whilst there is now a broad consensus that it is permissi-
ble . . . to be contact between counsel and witnesses for the
purpose of preparing witness evidence for admission in in-
ternational arbitration, considerable differences continue to
exist under both the ethical rules regulating the conduct of
counsel and under the arbitration laws of different jurisdic-
tion as to what constitutes permissible "witness
preparation."
... At present the position is, generally speaking, that na-
tional standards prevail, with national standards being
driven by consideration of what is acceptable in national
courts or professional bodies.40
Indeed, where witness preparation is forbidden by domestic ethics
rules, if ICA Lawyers contact witnesses before the proceeding, they are still
theoretically subject to discipline exactly as they would be for conduct in
their jurisdiction, unless the jurisdiction provides an exception for ICA.
The national rules on contacts with witnesses are indeed quite differ-
ent. While in the United States preparing a witness is part of a lawyer's
duty,41 the extent to which witness preparation is admissible in other coun-
tries (even other common law countries) is different.
In England, for example, communication with witnesses for the pur-
pose of discussing evidence is generally not allowed. In the Barristers'
Code of Conduct there is a prohibition for barristers "to rehearse practise
or coach a witness" and to "communicate directly or indirectly about a case
39. Rogers, supra note 28, at 7 n. 23. For the text of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Arbitrations, see http://www.ibanet.org/SearchlTaxonomy.aspx?Taxonomy=rules%20of%
20Evidence&TaxonomyUid=283A3DDD-D500-4EBC-86C7-FB7BC364A36E (last visited Sept. 25,
2013).
40. Meredith & Khan, supra note 38, at 1-2 (discussing the "ethical, legal, and other considera-
tions that arise from the different levels of witness contact viewed as permissible across several jurisdic-
tions" and suggesting "ways that, in the absence of transactional standards, the tribunal might seek to
deal with any asymmetry arising in the specific circumstances of the particular case").
41. "Witness preparation is considered .... to be an essential part of trial advocacy. Most Amer-
ican lawyers would laugh at the suggestion that witness preparation should be prohibited. American
lawyers assert that witness preparation is an essential step in zealous representation." Flowers, supra
note 36, at 1007-08.
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with any witness, whether or not the witness is his lay client, once that
witness has begun to give evidence." 42
To be precise: While "[t]here is no longer any rule which prevents a
barrister from having contact with any witness" 4 3 and neither a rule "which
prevents a barrister from having contact with a witness whom he may ex-
pect to call and examine in chief, with a view to introducing himself to the
witness, explaining the court's procedure (and in particular the procedure
for giving evidence), and answering any questions on procedure which the
witness may have,"4 the possibility of discussing evidence with the witness
is very limited. In short, in England, while discussing evidence is not
blankly forbidden anymore, professional standards seriously limit the
practice.45
42. BARRISTERS' CODE OF CONDUcr R. 705, available at https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/
regulatory-requirements/the-code-of-conduct/the-code-of-conduct/part-vii-conduct-of-work-by-
practising-barristers/#contact (last visited Sept. 25, 2013). A barrister must not:
(a) rehearse practise or coach a witness in relation to his evidence;
(b) encourage a witness to give evidence which is untruthful or which is not the whole truth;
(c) except with the consent of the representative for the opposing side or of the Court, com-
municate directly or indirectly about a case with any witness, whether or not the witness is his
lay client, once that witness has begun to give evidence until the evidence of that witness has
been concluded.
Id.
43. WRITTEN STANDARDS FOR THE CONDUCT OF PROFESSIONAL WORK § 6.1.2, available at
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/regulatory-requirements/the-code-of-conduct/written-standards-
for-the-conduct-of-professional-work/ (this is "a guide to the way in which a barrister should carry out
his work") (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
44. Id. at § 6.1.3.
45. The guide also includes the following rules:
Although there is no longer any rule which prevents a barrister from having contact with
witnesses, for such purposes a barrister should exercise his discretion and consider very care-
fully whether and to what extent such contact is appropriate, bearing in mind in particular that
it is not the barrister's function (but that of his professional client) to investigate and collect
evidence.
Id. at § 6.2.2.
The guiding principle must be the obligation of counsel to promote and protect his lay client's
best interests so far as that is consistent with the law and with counsel's overriding duty to the
court (Code of Conduct paragraphs 302, 303).
Id. at § 6.2.3.
A barrister should be alert to the risks that any discussion of the substance of a case with a
witness may lead to suspicions of coaching, and thus tend to diminish the value of the witness's
evidence in the eyes of the court, or may place the barrister in a position of professional
embarrassment, for example if he thereby becomes himself a witness in the case. These dan-
gers are most likely to occur if such discussion takes place:
(a) before the barrister has been supplied with a proof of the witness's evidence or
(b) in the absence of the barrister's professional client or his representative.
A barrister should also be alert to the fact that, even in the absence of any wish or intention to
do so, authority figures do subconsciously influence lay witnesses. Discussion of the substance
of the case may unwittingly contaminate the witness's evidence.
Id. at § 6.2.4.
There is particular danger where such discussions:
(a) take place in the presence of more than one witness of fact; or
(b) involve the disclosure to one witness of fact of the factual evidence of another
witness.
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In civil law countries witness preparation is generally even more re-
stricted than in England. For example:
[I]n civil law countries, witnesses are not prepared. Instead,
the lawyer will nominate a witness for a particular topic and
then argue the significance of that testimony. In Germany,
contacting non-party witnesses is actually unethical. Under
the circumstances, a lawyer is prohibited from preparing
witnesses, and cannot even contact other witnesses to deter-
mine what they might say.46
France does not have a specific statute on witness preparation; how-
ever, it is a criminal offense to try to influence a possible witness to a crimi-
nal investigation. Because the investigating magistrates carry out an
objective investigation, it is generally understood that any side investiga-
tion is likely to be obstruction of justice. We can say that the prohibition of
witness preparation comes from the statute prohibiting influencing/pressur-
ing witnesses (article 434-15 of the Criminal Code). 47  Because the word
"influence" has a broad interpretation, it is difficult to differentiate be-
tween "influence" of and "advice" to a witness. Because French judges will
evaluate lawyers' conduct on a case-by-case basis, without clear guidelines,
witness preparation is a risk.48
In Italy, while it is not unethical for an attorney to contact witnesses,
attorneys cannot discuss with them the object of their testimony or offer
suggestions to obtain favorable testimony.4 9 In addition, Italian judges
may draw a negative inference from testimony that sounds rehearsed.
These practices have been strongly deprecated by the courts as tending inevitably to en-
courage the rehearsal or coaching of witnesses and to increase the risk of fabrication or con-
tamination of evidence: R v Arif (1993) May 26; Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour
Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd [1992] BCLC 1104, [1994] 1 /WLR 1271....
Id. at § 6.2.5.
46. Robert D. Kolar & Katherine L. Haennicke, The Hague Convention On Taking Evidence
Abroad In Civil Or Commercial Matters, available at http://www.thefederation.org/documents/kolar-
su03.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
47. C. PEN. art. 434-15:
Le fait d'user de promesses, offres, prdsents, pressions, menaces, voies de fait, manoeuvres ou
artifices au cours d'une proc6dure ou en vue d'une demande ou d6fense en justice afin de
d6terminer autrui soit A faire ou ddlivrer une d6position, une d6claration ou une attestation
mensongbre, soit A s'abstenir de faire on d61ivrer une deposition, une d6claration ou une attes-
tation, est puni de trois ans d'emprisonnement et de 45000 euros d'amende, m6me si la subor-
nation n'est pas suivie d'effet.
48. Emails in 2013 with Stephane de Navacelle of Navacelle Avocts, Paris. We thank Stephane
de Navacelle for his insights about French law.
49. See Article 52 of the Italian Code of Conduct, available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/
user.upload/NTCdocument/Italy-EN-ethicalcol_1236161856.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2013). An at-
torney must avoid discussing with witnesses the facts object to the proceeding with suggestions aimed at
obtaining favorable testimonies.
295
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 32:283
For completeness, we should point out that in some civil law countries,
the peculiarity of ICA has been recognized, and these countries allow their
lawyers to prepare witnesses in ICA.so
2. Divergence in the Rules Dealing with Client Communications
In the United States, communication with clients is one of the most
fundamental duties of the attorney. Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct provides a broad duty to communicate with clients."' Lack
of communication is a common basis for discipline of lawyers in the US. 5 2
Since the decision concerning the objects of the representation, such as
whether to accept an offer of settlement, is reserved to client, then the
lawyer generally must promptly communicate to the client every new offer
of settlement.54
In other countries the duty to communicate is subject to many excep-
tions. In the 1998 Explanatory Memorandum and Commentary55 on the
CCBE Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community, 56 a
comment to Article 5.3 states:
50. Meredith & Kahn, supra note 38, at 3 ("In court cases in Belgium, France, Italy and Switzer-
land, all contact with witnesses is prohibited. Each of these countries has, however, implemented spe-
cific carve outs to their national ethical codes to provide for the situation when counsel are engaged in
international arbitration proceedings").
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.4 (2012).
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be
accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.
Id.
52. See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass'n v. Axner, 135 Ohio St. 3d 241 (Ohio 2013) (grounds for
discipline included violation of various provisions of Model Rule 1.4).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R 1.2(a) (2012).
54. See Model Rule 1.4, comment 1, providing that:
[A] lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or
a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance
unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable
or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer.
See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R.1.2(a).
55. CCBE: Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for
European lawyers, Jonathan Goldsmith ed. 2010, available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user
upload/NTCdocument/EN Codeofconductpl_1306748215.pdf (last visited Sept. 26. 2013) [hereinaf-
ter Explanatory Memorandum]. The Memorandum was issued when the 1988 Code of Conduct for
European Lawyers was modified in 1998. The Code has also been modified in 2002 and 2006.
56. See explanation of the CCBE infra Part IV(C).
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In certain Member States communications between lawyers
(written or by word of mouth) are normally regarded as to
be kept confidential as between the lawyers. This means
that the content of these communications cannot be dis-
closed to others, cannot normally be passed to the lawyers'
clients, and at any event cannot be produced in court.
For example:
[T]he French doctrine sous la foi du Palais may require that
an attorney maintain as confidential as against his own cli-
ent a communication conveyed by opposing counsel, even if
such communication contains a proposed settlement that
U.S. ethical rules mandate that the attorney disclose to the
client.
While the "sous la foi du Palais" is not universal in Europe (and the
CCBE Memorandum explains some differences among the member
states)59 it is nonetheless quite widespread.60
In a proceeding in which an ICA Lawyer is bound to share every com-
munication with his or her client while other ICA Lawyers do not have this
obligation (or are even forbidden to so sharing), negotiation might be ex-
tremely difficult.
3. Divergence in the Relationship Between Fellow Lawyers
The Model Rules have sparse regulation of the relationship among fel-
low lawyers: Rule 3.4 contains limited provisions on fairness to the oppos-
ing party and counsel; Rule 3.5 deals with improper attempts to influence
the judge or jury; Rule 4.2 prohibits communication with persons repre-
sented by counsel; and Rule 4.4 includes general language dealing with re-
spect for rights of third persons. These provisions are quite general and
57. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 55, at 30.
58. Rogers, supra note 28, at 4. Just to make another example, in Italy the correspondence with
the attorney for the other party must also sometimes be kept secret from the client. Article 28 of the
Code of Conduct provides: "The correspondence that have been qualified as 'confidential' and any
correspondence containing a settlement proposal cannot be produced at trial or referred to."
59. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 55, commentary to Article 5.3:
In yet other Member States, the lawyer has to keep the client fully informed of all relevant
communications from a professional colleague acting for another party, and marking a letter
as "confidential" only means that it is a legal matter intended for the recipient lawyer and his
or her client, and not to be misused by third parties.
60. The current CCBE Code of Conduct in Article 5.3 takes an intermediate position on the
issue of communication with clients:
5.3.1. If a lawyer intends to send communications to a lawyer in another Member State, which
the sender wishes to remain confidential or without prejudice he or she would certainly ex-
press this intention prior to communicating the first of the documents.
5.3.2. If the prospective recipient of the communications is unable to assure their status as
confidential or without prejudice he or she should inform the sender accordingly without
delay.
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often vague, and it is rare that US lawyers are sanctioned for their dealings
with fellow lawyers.
In the past it might have been the case that the relationship between
fellow lawyers in the US was characterized by substantial comradeship, but
this is not the situation today.61 Probably the best evidence of the decline
in relationships among lawyers in the US is the advent of civility or profes-
sionalism codes.62 Several sections of the ABA and many jurisdictions
have adopted these codes to supplement the rules of professional con-
duct.6 The codes typically deal with three types of relationship: between
lawyers and their clients, between lawyers and the courts, and between law-
yers and other lawyers. The Model Rules include many provisions on the
lawyer-client relationship, but few on the relationships between lawyers or
with the courts. The civility codes-even if sometimes a very detailed and
well inspired effort to regulate the relationship among lawyers-are merely
precatory, as you can see from the use of the verb "should." In addition to
the civility codes, some courts have introduced civility requirements in the
lawyer's oath of office64 and have started to sanction uncivil behavior,65 but
such proceedings are still uncommon.
The European regulation of the relationship among lawyers is much
more substantial than in the US.6 6 In Italy the relationship among lawyers
is called "comradeship among lawyers" ("rapporto di colleganza") and is
very important. For example, article 23 of the Italian Code of Ethics states:
"In litigation an attorney must inspire his or her conduct to the duty of
61. As a curiosity: In 2003 in Massachusetts Nathan Crystal, one of the co-authors of this article,
had a conversation with a seasoned practitioner. This practitioner lamented the modern practice of
lawyers to send to fellow lawyers a letter or an email confirming the content of an oral agreement; he
said that this practice would have been considered very uncivil when he was a young lawyer, in the mid-
fifties or early sixties.
62. In 1997, Chief Justice Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals wrote:
[I]t is ... undeniable that with our exploding numbers and increased bottom line pressure, the
practice of law has grown tougher and meaner, eroding a core tradition of courtesy and civil-
ity. That we have in addition suffered a great loss in public trust and confidence is no secret.
Now it is for us to do something about the situation.
Judith S. Kaye, How do we make the Standard of Civility Work?, Preface to NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED
COURT SYSTEM STANDARDS OF CIVILITY (1997), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/labor_1aw/meetings/2009/2009_ethicsh.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 26,
2013).
63. For a chart showing professionalism codes around the country, see ABA PROFESSIONALISM
CODES, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/resources/
professionalism/professionalismcodes.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
64. See, e.g., S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 402 (2013) ("Lawyer's Oath"), available at
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?rulelD=402&subRulelD=&ruleType=APP
(last visited Sept. 26, 2013). Among other commitments, the Oath requires:
To opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness. integrity, and civility, not only in
court, but also in all written and oral communications;
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me only such means as are
consistent with trust and honor and the principles of professionalism, and will never seek to
mislead an opposing party, the judge or jury by a false statement of fact or law . . ..
65. See, e.g., In re Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 2011); In
re White, 707 S.E.2d 411 (S.C. 2011).
66. See generally CCBE CODE OF CONDucT art. 5.1-5.9.
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defense but without affecting as far as possible the comradeship among
lawyers." As one commentator on Italian practice has said:
The principle of protecting the client must not be intended
in an absolute way. Indeed, if it is certainly wrong the old
principle that the fellow lawyer comes before anything else,
it is also wrong [following] the opposite principle that the
client's interest has to be pursued at all costs. As a matter
of fact . . . pursuant to article 23, it is ethically improper and
sanctionable for a lawyer to allow a hearing to start immedi-
ately after the scheduled time, so taking advantage of a
slight delay by the other party;67 or (art. 28) for a lawyer-
in order to benefit his client's position,-to file with the
court or to disclose to the court the confidential letters [re-
ceived from the fellow lawyer] and always the correspon-
dence among lawyers when this contain settlement
proposals. 8
As it is evident, an ICA Lawyer bound to adhere to a "comradership"
principle and an ICA Lawyer not bound by that principle, have "unequal
arms" in the same proceeding.
IV. DETERMINING THE RELEVANT SET OF ETHICS RULES
A. Theoretical Ways in which the Applicable Set of Ethics
Can Be Identified
When lawyers perform their professional activities completely within
the jurisdiction where the lawyers are admitted to practice, the determina-
tion of the applicable set of ethics rules is simple. The rules of ethics of the
jurisdiction of the lawyer's admission ("home" jurisdiction) are the rules
that obviously govern the conduct of the lawyer "at home." The identifica-
tion of the applicable body of ethics rules becomes complicated when the
lawyer is admitted in more than one jurisdiction, or when the lawyer is
admitted in one jurisdiction but renders services in another ("host" juris-
diction"). For the purpose of this article we refer to these types of situa-
tions as "cross-border transactions." The problem is particularly serious
when the two or more competing bodies of ethics rules are inconsistent
with one another (the "double deontology" discussed above).
There are several possible answers to the question "which ethics rules
should govern cross-border transactions:"6 9 (1) The no-guidance approach;
67. While the principle is still valid, the case law has started to focus more on the client's interest.
See, e.g., CNF Mar. 8, 2002 no. 13, Rass. Forense n. 3/2002 (holding that a lawyer that had waited only
two hours for the other party's counsel did not act unethically because after such unreasonable delay, it
is not unethical for a lawyer to put the interest of his client first).
68. Antonino Ciavola, La deontologia dell'avvocato all'interno del processo, summary of the con-
ference held in Catania by AIGA on Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://www.altalex.comlindex.php
?idnot=1986 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
69. Nagel, supra note 31, at 472.
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(2) the home-state approach; (3) Conflicts of Law approach; (4) the host-
state approach; (5) the harmonized code approach.70
Under the first approach, the domestic jurisdiction offers no guidance
to the lawyer involved in a cross-border transaction. The problem of
"double deontology," if any, will simply be considered in any disciplinary
proceeding that might arise. This is the approach suggested or implied by
practitioners who claim that there is no need for ethical rules in interna-
tional arbitration because practitioners know how to behave.7 Under a
home-state approach, lawyers make their own decisions and in case a disci-
plinary proceeding ensues in the host jurisdiction, the home state can inter-
vene to support the lawyers.7 2 Under the "conflict of law approach," every
jurisdiction (or international association of domestic authorities) enacts its
own conflict rule that hopefully will guide lawyers towards a certain set of
ethics rules. Under the host state approach, lawyers obey the ethics code
of the host state, except for some rules of their home state that they are
required to comply with. 74 Under the harmonized code approach, an inter-
national code is issued and lawyers engaged in international transactions
are required to comply with it.75 The current ways in which various coun-
tries identify the set of ethics rules that apply to ICA Lawyers are expres-
sions, in one way or another, of the above five theoretical approaches
(although in practice the approaches are sometimes combined).
70. These are essentially the categories used by Nagel in Double Deontology, except that he
called them: A. Ignore the Problem; B. Home State Assistance Approach; C. Conflicts of Law Ap-
proach; D. Positive List Approach; E. Harmonized Rules Approach. Id. at 473-77.
71. Evidence shows that these practitioners are wrong and there is a need for ethical standards in
international arbitration. See Sussman & Ebere, supra note 4. See also Catherine A. Rogers, Ethics in
International Arbitration: Introduction and Chapter One (Oxford University Press Accepted Paper Se-
ries), note 22.
72. Another response to double deontology problems allows the lawyer to make his own deci-
sion, but allows the Home State to make submissions in the lawyer's disciplinary proceeding to bolster
his defense. The ABA-Brussels Bar Agreement is an excellent example of this approach. Nagel, supra
note 31, at 474.
73. The theory behind the Conflicts of Law response to double deontology problems is that
every state creates regulations which consider the weight and application of foreign elements in a case.
For example, each licensing body develops a listing of how ethical rules apply to the situations in which
a particular court may exercise its jurisdiction and which rule takes precedence when a conflict arises.
The response resolves double deontology problems where one or both jurisdictions involved has previ-
ously specified the ethical code that applies when there is conflict. Notably, the parties involved (i.e.,
the Home State and Host State) need not make this decision because a third party may exercise this
right ..... [If the ethical codes of the Home and Host States conflict, there is a high likelihood that their
Conflicts of Law choices will also conflict. Therefore, implementing the Conflicts of Laws response to
the double deontology problem creates additional conflict in multi-layered situation caused by each
party insisting that both its ethical and conflicts of law rules constitute the appropriate method of reso-
lution. Id. at 475-76.
74. [A] lawyer obeys the Host State's ethical code with the exception of certain rules specified in
advance. Essentially, the Home State allows its lawyers to apply the other nation's ethical code to
resolve most issues, but for certain issues, such as conflicts of interest, it requires compliance with its
own code. Id. at 476-77.
75. [U]nder ... [this approach] the multiple ethical codes are combined into a solitary guideline
with the force of law. Every lawyer engaging in cross-border practice would be required to follow this
code, effectively eliminating double deontology problems .... The CCBE Code is an attempt to imple-
ment this Harmonized Rules approach. but it faces major problems. The differences in legal traditions
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B. The "Home Country" Approach -Using National Standards
One approach to identifying the ethics rules applicable to ICA Law-
yers is to apply the ethics rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
admitted."6 However, the home country approach is clearly deficient as a
method of identifying the ethics rules applicable to ICA Lawyers. This ap-
proach does not solve either the problem of "double deontology" or "un-
level playing field." Suppose a French lawyer is involved in an arbitration
in Washington D.C. and attempts to prepare a witness for testimony. The
lawyer's conduct is permitted in D.C., indeed competency would require
such preparation under U.S. ethics rules. However, witness preparation
is unethical in France, and the lawyer could be subject to sanction there.
Further, this approach results in an unlevel playing field. French lawyers
involved in arbitrations cannot prepare their witnesses for testimony, while
their American counterparts can ethically do so. The home county ap-
proach suffers from another flaw: By subjecting ICA Lawyers to standards
of their home jurisdictions, it ignores the legitimate interest of tribunals to
control the conduct of lawyers before the tribunal. On the other hand, the
home country approach has two significant advantages: clear guidance to
lawyers on how to act ethically78 and it subjects lawyers to standards with
which they should be familiar. However, in our opinion these advantages
are outweighed by the substantial costs of the home country approach.
C. "Host State" Standards: the CCBE Approach79
When national jurisdictions (and international organizations) have
tried to provide some direction, they have generally chosen the "host state"
and ethical codes between nations are at the heart of the double deontology problems and will exist
irrespective of any compromises that are made. Id. at 477-78.
76. If the lawyer is admitted in more than one jurisdiction, and the two sets of rules conflict,
there might be a problem in identifying which one should apply. In some cases, this problem could be
solved by applying the most restrictive rule. In some other cases, the problem could not be solved so
easily (for example when the two sets of ethics rule prescribe an inconsistent behavior, so that the
lawyer by complying with one rule, violates the other (e.g., duty to communicate with client and duty
deriving from the "sous la foi du Palais" doctrine).
77. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
78. With the exception of the case in which lawyers are subject to different standards because
they have several admissions.
79. Nagel has characterized the CCBE Code as a harmonized approach but for the reasons dis-
cussed below we think it is more properly characterized as either a "host country" approach or perhaps
a compromise solution that respects both host and home country rules. If you want to see the CCBE as
a harmonized code, we should say that it is more a harmonized international private law code (i.e., a
code that establishes and harmonizes conflict rules) than a harmonized ethics code (i.e., a code that
positively establishes rules of ethics.) See Nagel, supra note 31, at 464. Despite the fact that the CCBE
Code has not "harmonized" the legal ethics rules from all Member States so as to provide substantive
provisions governing all issues, the CCBE Code has, in essence, attempted to harmonize the "conflicts
of law" choices facing a lawyer. It has attempted (although not always successfully) to provide clear
rules stating in which situations a lawyer's "Home State" ethics rule governs and in which situations a
lawyer's "Host State" ethics rule govern. See generally Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Euro-
pean Community's Legal Ethics Code Part k An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 45 (1993). As we said, in most cases, the "Host State" approach is the one chosen by
the CCBE.
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standard. The CCBE, an organization among European bars, 0 has promul-
gated a Code of Conduct for European Lawyers ("CCBE Code").s The
CCBE Code was drafted with the intention of giving guidance to lawyers
and dealing with the "double deontology" problem.8 2 The CCBE Code
dates back to October 28, 1988, and has been amended three times since
then. (The latest amendment occurred on May 19, 2006.)" The CCBE
Code applies "to lawyers as they are defined by Directive 77/249/EEC and
by Directive 98/5/EC and to lawyers of the Associate and Observer Mem-
bers of the CCBE."84 The Code applies when a European lawyer engages
in cross-border activities. 5
The CCBE Code provides for a general duty to respect the ethics rules
of the place where the activity is performed, thus opting for the "host state"
principle. The Explanatory Memorandum to the CCBE Code contains an
extensive discussion of several directives of the European Union that deal
with cross border practice. Without going into the detail of these direc-
tives, they essentially require lawyers engaging in cross border practice to
comply with the ethics rules of the host country.8 6 If this were the only
principle that the CCBE would follow, the issue of "double deontology"
would be solved. Alas, this not the case: while the CCBE Code has a sub-
stantial strand of host country emphasis, the Code does not ignore the in-
terests of the home country. Indeed, the CCBE Code does not exclude
that the lawyer may be also subject to his or her "home state" ethics rules.
Lawyers generally remain subject to home country rules even when bound
to respect the rules of other countries. The Commentary to Article 2.4
states that in performing services on an occasional or temporary basis in
another country, a lawyer pursuing these activities shall observe the rules
80. The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) represents the bars and law socie-
ties of 31 member countries and 11 further associate and observer countries, and through them around
1 million European lawyers. For further explanation of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Eu-
rope (CCBE), see http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=375&L-0 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013). For a list of
member countries, see http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=22&L0 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
81. For the text of the CCBE Code, see http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTC
document/ENCode-of conductpl1306748215.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
82. Realizing the growing inconsistency in ethical codes on the national level, the Council of Bars
and Law Societies of Europe adopted the CCBE Code in 1998 to unify the legal profession in Europe
and guide practitioners in the expanding transactional practice. The CCBE Code "is a framework of
principles of professional conduct" that individual lawyers can use to structure their transnational prac-
tices. The CCBE intended that the Code be domestically binding, as well as governing all cross-border
activities in the European Community; however, the CCBE Code is not binding unless the "rules are
adopted as enforceable rules by [the] particular Bar [of both the Home and Host States]." Nagel, supra
note 31, at 459-60.
83. See Explanatory Memorandum supra note 55, at 10.
84. See CCBE CODE art. 1.4, para.1.
85. See id. at art. 1.5, para 1. This provision is binding on all member States: all lawyers who are
members of the bars of these countries (whether their bars are full, associate, or observer members of
the CCBE) have to comply with the Code in their cross-border activities within the European
Union, the European Economic Area, and the Swiss Confederation as well as within associate and
observer countries. It is worth noting that even if the CCBE Code states that the Code is "binding," the
Code is not binding in itself but it has become binding by adoption by the several national bars. Nagel,
supra note 31, at 459-60.
86. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 55, at art. 2.4.
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of professional conduct of the Host Member State, without prejudice to the
lawyer's obligations in the Member State from which he or she comes. 87
The clash between the two principles is well expressed in Article 2.4 (Re-
spect for the Rules of Other Bars and Law Societies):
When practicing cross-border, a Lawyer from another mem-
ber state may be bound to comply with the professional
rules of the Host Member State. Lawyers have a duty to
inform themselves as to the rules which will affect them in
the performance of any particular activity. (emphasis
added)
Another specific example of the "host country" approach is the Italian
Code of Ethics, which has the following provision for an Italian attorney
working abroad:
Code of Conduct Article 4-The activity abroad, and the ac-
tivity in Italy of a foreigner. In the performance of those
professional activities abroad that are allowed by law, Ital-
ian attorneys must comply with the ethics rules of the juris-
diction in which they perform the activity.
The foreign attorney performing their activities in Italy,
when this performance is allowed, must comply with Italian
ethics rules.89
Application of "host country" rules to ICA raises several problems.
First, and most important, what is the "host country?" Is it the country
where the arbitration panel conducts the hearing or where the arbitration
institution (if there is one) has its principal office? The site of the arbitra-
tion or the principal office of the arbitration provider may not bear any
significant relationship to the dispute, the parties, or the lawyers. For ex-
ample, consider the case of American and Brazilian lawyers handling an
arbitration under the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) rules
(ICC is based in Paris), between an American company and a Brazilian
company, where the hearing is held in Mexico City. Under the "Host
Country" approach, the lawyers would be bound by Mexican ethics rules
(or maybe French rules), which do not necessarily have any reasonable re-
lationship to the dispute or to the lawyers, and would require them to gain
familiarity with a set of ethics rules that they are not accustomed to using.
Indeed, in this example, American and Brazilian ethics rules would be ir-
relevant, which would surely strike the lawyers involved as strange. Sec-
ond, unless home country authorities accept application of host country
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. ITALIAN CODE OF ETHICS, available at http://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/site/home/
area-avvocati/codice-deontologico-forense/articolo5792.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
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rules, lawyers face the "double deontology" problem. The "host country"
approach does, however, have the advantage of solving the "inequality of
arms" problem.
D. The Rule in the United States: a Conflicts-of-Law Approach
Rule 8.5(b) of the ABA Model Rules is the basic rule to identify the
ethics rules applicable to cross-border transactions in the US:90
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary au-
thority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct
to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending
before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the
tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide oth-
erwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in
which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predomi-
nant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the
rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.
A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's
conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which
the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of
the lawyer's conduct will occur.
Comment 7 makes it clear that the drafters intended for Rule 8.5 to
apply to international as well as domestic matters: "The choice of law pro-
vision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless interna-
tional law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory
authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise." However, Rule
8.5(b) fails to offer guidance to ICA Lawyers because the Rule is filled with
ambiguity when applied to ICA.
90. Of course, some US jurisdictions have adopted modifications of Rule 8.5, but we cannot deal
with the several versions in this paper. Because the departure from the basic Model Rule 8.5 is impor-
tant, we want to mention New York Rule 8.5, which provides as follows:
(b) In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this state, the rules of professional conduct
to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) For conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has
been admitted to practice (either generally or for purposes of that proceeding), the rules
to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules
of the court provide otherwise; and
(2) For any other conduct:
(i) If the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this state, the rules to be applied shall be
the rules of this state, and
(ii) If the lawyer is licensed to practice in this state and another jurisdiction, the rules to
be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally
practices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly has its predominant ef-
fect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that
jurisdiction shall be applied to that conduct.
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At first glance it appears that Rule 8.5(b)(1) should apply to ICA.
Without a doubt ICA panels are "tribunals" for the purpose of Rule
8.5(b)(1). Applying this provision (which we can call the "local rules"
rule), however, does not clearly identify the set of ethics rules applicable to
ICA Lawyers because it leaves open a number of important questions.
First, where does an arbitration tribunal "sit." For example, if the par-
ties choose to arbitrate under the auspices of the ICC, but pursuant to the
parties' arbitration clause ("The arbitration shall be held in Buenos Aires,
Argentina.") the arbitrators hold their meetings in Buenos Aires, it is un-
clear whether the place where the tribunal "sits" is Paris, where ICC is
located, or Buenos Aires, where the arbitrators meet. The situation can
become more complex if the arbitrators hold hearing in several places,
when authorized by the arbitration clause or ordered by the arbitrators.
We note that the place where the arbitrators actually meet can have noth-
ing to do with the parties or the matter. As noticed above, the parties
might have chosen a place only for travel convenience rather than relation-
ship to the matter (e.g., it is half way between party A and party B or it is
the place where the majority of the arbitrators live), or the parties might
have chosen (as it is often the case) a "neutral" site that has nothing to do
with the dispute, or the parties might not have identified the place, which is
then chosen by the arbitrators according to their convenience. In these
cases is the place of the meeting of any significance? And what if the arbi-
trators do not "meet" in one place and instead simply hold their meetings
via conference call while physically located in different jurisdictions? In
this situation, where does the arbitration panel "sit"?
Defining the place where the "tribunal sits" looking at the principal
location of the institution under which rules the arbitration takes place
(i.e., Paris in the case of the ICC) is also unsatisfactory. The parties may
not choose to have their arbitration conducted under the auspices of any
organization; if they choose this "free standing" model of arbitration, Rule
8.5(b)(1)'s tribunal would not have a seat-an absurd result. In addition,
some international arbitration organizations provide that the "place of ar-
bitration" is the place chosen by the parties for the meetings of the arbitra-
tors, with some default rules in case the parties have not chosen the place,
in which case we return to the problems discussed in the previous
paragraph. 91
91. See, e.g., Article 18 of the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, which
provides in relevant part:
Article 18-Place of the Arbitration
1 The place of the arbitration shall be fixed by the Court, unless agreed upon by the parties.
2 The arbitral tribunal may, after consultation with the parties, conduct hearings and meet-
ings at any location it considers appropriate, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
3 The arbitral tnbunal may deliberate at any location it considers appropriate.
Or see Rule 18 of the SIAC Singapore International Arbitration Center Rules:
Rule 18 - Seat of Arbitration
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Second, to what extent is the conduct of ICA Lawyers governed by the
"local rules"? Rule 8.5(b)(1) refers to "conduct in connection with a matter
pending before a tribunal." This language leaves open the question of
which conduct is "in connection with" the matter? Obviously, by this very
language ("in connection with"), "local rules" should not be limited to ICA
Lawyers' conduct in hearings before the tribunal: conduct that is not in the
presence of the tribunal but is directly related to the proceeding would be
covered. For example, interviewing witnesses to prepare for the hearing
would clearly be covered by the local ethics rules. But a substantial grey
area remains for ICA Lawyers' conduct that is less directly related to the
matter. For example, would an agreement by an ICA Lawyer with a litiga-
tion funder be subject to local ethics rules and what if those rules do not
deal with litigation funding?92
Third, does the language "unless the rules of the tribunal provide other-
wise" allow the "local rules" to be overridden by an agreement between the
parties when approved by the tribunal for a different set of rules to apply?
For example, suppose an ICA between a US company and a Brazilian com-
pany both of whom are represented by American lawyers. Suppose the
panel consists of two Americans and one Brazilian. Suppose further the
place of ICA is in Brazil. The arbitration agreement provides that New
York law governs. The lawyers agree that the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct should apply to the proceeding, and the arbitrators are will-
ing to accept this agreement. Is the agreement valid thereby making the
ABA rules applicable under Rule 8.5(b)(1)? Under Rule 8.5(b)(1), we do
not know. As more fully discussed below, we think the agreement should
be valid because arbitration is fundamentally a matter of agreement.
Fourth, what rules apply if the "local rules" specify that they do not
apply (for example, there is an express exception in local ethics rules for
ICA), or direct to the ethics rules of another jurisdiction which redirects
back to be "local rules"? This is called the "renvoi" problem.)
For the above reasons, it is our opinion that Rule 8.5(b)(1) cannot be
applied to ICA. If Rule 8.5(b)(1) does not govern, then Rule 8.5(b)(2)
applies. This Rule points to the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where "the
lawyer's conduct occurred" unless "the predominant effect" is in another
jurisdiction, in which case the rules of that jurisdiction control. However,
the rule is subject to an exception; the lawyer is not subject to discipline "if
18.1 The parties may agree on the seat of arbitration. Failing such an agreement, the seat of
arbitration shall be Singapore, unless the Tribunal determines, having regard to all the circum-
stances of the case, that another seat is more appropriate.
18.2 The Tribunal may hold hearings and meetings by any means it considers expedient or
appropriate and at any location it considers convenient or appropriate.
92. Litigation funding is a growing phenomenon around the world, and a number of litigation
funders are actively involved in funding international commercial arbitration. See the websites of two
public litigation funding companies, Burford Capital, http://www.burfordcapital.com/litigation-finance/
case-studies/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2013), and Juridica Investments, Ltd., http://www.juridicainvestments
.com/about-juridica.aspx (last visited Sept. 26. 2013).
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the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the law-
yer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will
occur."
Even if we think that Rule 8.5(b)(2) should be applied, it also suffers
from ambiguities. Under Rule 8.5(b)(1), it was necessary to determine
where the tribunal "sits." Under Rule 8.5(b)(2) lawyers must determine
(1) where their conduct occurred, (2) where the predominant effect of their
conduct took place, and (3) where they reasonably believe the predomi-
nant effect of their conduct occurred. These determinations are not easy in
case of ICA. Consider a situation in which an ICA Lawyer, with offices in
Washington, D.C., drafts a brief to be submitted to an arbitration panel in
Shanghai on behalf of a Virginia company; the adverse party is a Chinese
company represented by New York counsel, and the panel consists of two
Chinese and one American arbitrator. Where does the lawyer's conduct
occur? Where is the predominant effect of the conduct? Where does the
lawyer reasonably believe that the predominant effect will occur? In sum-
mary, in ICA where the location of the ICA Lawyers, the clients, the arbi-
trators, the site of the arbitration, and the seat of the arbitration providers
may all be in different countries (and especially now that modern technol-
ogy allows lawyers to perform activities remotely), the place where conduct
occurs and where the lawyer has a reasonable belief that the predominant
effect of that conduct will be, are all difficult if not impossible to determine.
Moreover, while Rule 8.5(b)(2) deals poorly with the problem of
"double deontology," it is completely silent on the problem of "leveling the
playing field." Rule 8.5 only applies to American lawyers; lawyers from
other countries will be subject to different rules, which may be more or less
restrictive.
E. Do We Need an International Code of Ethics for ICA Lawyers?
Since the 1970s a number of scholars have recognized the need for
uniform ethical standards in ICA.9 3 More recently, Professor Catherine
Rogers has argued for an international code of ethics to govern ICA94 and
for arbitrators to have the power to enforce such a code." In 2010 Doak
Bishop, one of the leading practitioners in the ICA field, advocated for
such a code in his keynote address at the ICCA ("International Council for
Commercial Arbitration") conference. 96
In the last few years several attempts have been made to develop
codes that could apply to ICA.9 7 In 2013 the International Bar Association
93. See Sussman & Ebere, supra note 4, at 616-18.
94. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 35. For a bibliography of Professor Rogers' work in interna-
tional arbitration, see http://law.psu.edu/faculty/resident-faculty/rogers (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
95. Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Discipline: Developing
an Enforcement Regime for Ethics in International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
96. Doak Bishop, Ethics in International Arbitration, http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/
12763302233510/iccariokeynote-speech.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
97. See Sussman & Ebere, supra note 4, at 618-20.
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issued "Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitra-
tion."" In 2011 the International Law Association Study Group on the
Practice and Procedure of International Tribunals issued the Hague Princi-
ples on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing Before International
Courts and Tribunals." Cyrus Benson has offered a unique approach by
proposing a checklist of ethical standards that lawyers for the parties could
choose to adopt either in full or standard-by-standard at the commence-
ment of the arbitration.'00
Without examining the substantive merits of each of these proposals,
they nonetheless suffer from some major difficulties: (i) Most importantly,
they have not been adopted by arbitration institutions or panels, and there
appears to be little likelihood that this will happen in the near future. The
only important situation that we know of in which an international code
became binding was the CCBE Code."' However, that code is not a satis-
factory solution to the ethical problems facing ICA Lawyers because it only
applies to European lawyers, is not specific about international arbitration,
and seems to require lawyers engaged in cross-border practice to comply
with both home and host country rules.'02 (ii) As for the other efforts of
uniform codes (such as the IBA), even if they might be clear, well-drafted,
and comprehensive, bluntly stated a code that does not apply to actual ICA
because of lack of adoption is not very helpful. (iii) Moreover, even if such
a code were accepted by arbitration institutions, there is no guarantee that
the disciplinary authorities in the various countries will accept the authority
of an international code. However, in these codification ideas we have
found seeds of support for the proposal we present in the next section.
We do not think that Mr. Benson's idea of an ethics checklist will be-
come widely accepted, because it will be cumbersome and time consuming
for parties to negotiate over ethical standards at the beginning of an arbi-
tration when other procedural and substantive matters are likely to occupy
their attention, and when the parties might have fundamental disagree-
ment. Nonetheless, at the core of Mr. Benson's proposal is the idea of
98. See http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publicationsIBA-guides-and free-materials.aspx
(last visited Sept. 26, 2013). The IBA is working on Guidelines for Conflicts of Interest in Arbitration.
The IBA has previously issued Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession, Rules of Ethics for
International Arbitrators, and Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, all of
which are available on the IBA website (http://www.ibanet.org/)
99. PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/
(last visited Sept. 26. 2013).
100. See Cyrus Benson, Can Professional Ethics Wait? The Need for Transparency in Interna-
tional Arbitration, 3 DISP. RESOL. INT'L 78 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/Documents/Benson-CanProfessionalEthicsWait.pdf (last visited Sept. 26. 2013).
101. See supra note 81. As said above. the CCBE Code is not in itself binding but it has become
binding by adoption by several national bars.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87. Similarly, the IBA Principles on Conduct for the
Legal Profession provide in Art. 2.3:
A lawyer who undertakes professional work in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not a full
member of the local profession shall adhere to applicable law and the standards of profes-
sional ethics in the jurisdiction of which the lawyer is a full member, and the lawyer shall
practice only to the extent this is permitted in the host jurisdiction and provided that all appli-
cable law and ethical standards of the host jurisdiction are observed.
[VOL. 32:283308
2013] ETHICAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
parties' agreement on ethical standards, the principle on which our propo-
sal is based.
Parties' power to establish rules of evidence by agreement10 3 provides
further support for our proposal. Based on this power the International
Bar Association has issued Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Interna-
tional Arbitrations ("IBA Rules of Evidence").104 The IBA Rules of Evi-
dence, first issued in 1999, have become widely used in international
arbitrations.10 The Rules were drafted to deal in part with cross-cultural
issues that arise in arbitration: "The IBA Rules of Evidence reflect proce-
dures in use in many different legal systems, and they may be particularly
useful when the parties come from different legal cultures." 106 Impor-
tantly, the Rules become operative by party agreement.'0 7 Paragraph 2 of
the Preamble states:
Parties and Arbitral Tribunals may adopt the IBA Rules of
Evidence, in whole or in part, to govern arbitration pro-
ceedings, or they may vary them or use them as guidelines
in developing their own procedures. The Rules are not in-
tended to limit the flexibility that is inherent in, and an ad-
vantage of, international arbitration, and Parties and
Arbitral Tribunals are free to adapt them to the particular
circumstances of each arbitration. 08
The drafters offer lawyers the language of a provision that they can
incorporate in their arbitration agreements to adopt the IBA Rules of
Evidence:
If parties wish to adopt the IBA Rules of Evidence in their
arbitration clause, it is recommended that they add the fol-
lowing language to the clause, selecting one of the alterna-
tives therein provided:
"[In addition to the institutional, ad hoc or other rules chosen
by the parties,] [t]he parties agree that the arbitration shall be
conducted according to the IBA Rules of Evidence as current
on the date of [this agreement/the commencement of the
arbitration].'0 9
103. See infra Part V(A).
104. See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (May 29, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.ibanet.org/About-theIBA/IBAresolutions.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
105. See Id. at 1.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 4. 2. See also Article 1 of same on the Scope of Application of the Rules.
109. Id. at 2-3.
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V. THE CONTRACTARIAN APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF
ETHIcs RULES APPLICABLE TO ICA LAWYERS
Let us repeat the question from which we have started: must the situa-
tion of ICA Lawyers necessarily be like the life of the main character of
One, No one, One Hundred Thousand after the discovery of his tilted nose?
Thinking about the differences of ethics rules and the issues of "double
deontology" and "inequality-of-arms," should ICA Lawyers really become
crazy for loss of identity? Not necessarily.
While waiting for the approval of a comprehensive set of rules, which
we hope will not be like Beckett's play, Waiting for Godot, we suggest a
different approach, one that is practical to accomplish, reasonably clear in
application, and leads to uniformity in the ethics rules applicable to ICA.
We call it a "contractual approach to ethical obligations in international
arbitrations." Simply said, our approach is that parties to an ICA may
choose the rules of ethics governing the conduct of the lawyers in the pro-
ceeding, just as they are free to agree on the substantive and procedural
law applicable to the proceeding.
A. Justifications for the Contractarian Approach
Our theory has several grounds for support, coming both from the
general theory of arbitration, from recent modifications to the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, from the transformation of the relation-
ships between lawyers and corporate clients, and from the practicality of its
implementation, particularly when compared to the proposal for an inter-
national code of ethics for ICA.
First, the validity of arbitration flows from the agreement of the par-
ties. The US Supreme Court has more than once used a "contractarian"
approach to solve issues connected to arbitration clauses."o Within the
limitations of freedom of contract, parties are free to establish the scope,
substantive law, and procedural rules governing their arbitration. In doing
so they may limit the rights that would otherwise exist. Thus, parties to an
arbitration may limit or forego discovery entirely, may change rules of evi-
dence, and may designate the substantive law that governs their dispute.
Why should parties also not be able to select the rules of ethics that apply
to lawyers in their proceeding? Whether these rules are considered proce-
dural or substantive"' should be irrelevant because parties to an arbitra-
tion may agree on both procedural and substantive rules. Parties' freedom
to choose rules of ethics governing their dispute is especially appealing
110. See e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011); Rent-A-Ctr., W.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2774 (2010); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440,
444 (2006): First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
111. We think that Rules of Professional Conduct are substantive rather than procedural for num-
ber of reasons: 1. Procedure deals with the way a tribunal handles a matter. Rules of ethics are not
limited to matters before tribunals; they deal with obligations that lawyers have to clients, other law-
yers, third parties, and tribunals. 2. Rules of ethics by their own language show they are not procedu-
ral. The rules often incorporate by reference as standards of conduct rules of procedure. but they go
beyond those rules.
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given the vacuum and uncertainty in the situation as it exists now. It might
be argued that rules of ethics are fundamental obligations of lawyers that
are not subject to agreement or modification by clients. This argument is
however unconvincing. Many rules of ethics are subject to waiver or con-
sent by a client. Consider the number of rules that are subject to informed
client consent.112 In addition, the argument ignores the fundamental basis
of arbitration, which is agreement of the parties.
Second, the recent amendment by the ABA to Model Rule 8.5 pro-
vides further support for the contractual approach that we advocate. At its
February 2013 meeting, the ABA House of Delegates amended comment 5
to Rule 8.5 to include the following provision:
With respect to conflicts of interest, in determining a law-
yer's reasonable belief under paragraph (b)(2), a written
agreement between the lawyer and client that reasonably
specifies a particular jurisdiction as within the scope of that
paragraph may be considered if the agreement was obtained
with the client's informed consent confirmed in the
agreement.
The rule in essence says that where there is doubt about which jurisdic-
tion's ethics rules govern a conflict of interest, a written agreement be-
tween lawyer and client obtained with the client's informed consent that
reasonably specifies a jurisdiction may be considered in determining
whether the lawyer was acting reasonably in following the rules of that
jurisdiction. To be sure the rule is hedged about with many qualifications
and it is limited to conflicts of interest. Nonetheless, the comment provides
support for our proposal that the parties should have the authority to
choose the ethics rules applicable to ICA. The new comment shows that
the ABA has concluded that an agreement between lawyer and client is
relevant to determine the appropriate ethics rules to govern a transaction
when it comes from a conflict of interest, at least when there is doubt about
what the relevant rules are.
Third, a slow but constant trend towards the "privatization" of the eth-
ics rules is occurring between corporate clients and their attorneys.' 13 Two
authors (Whelan and Ziv) examined many outside counsel guidelines and
"other formal terms of engagement, as well as informal norms that shape
the relationship between lawyers and clients."114
Our main finding is that corporate clients, and in particular global cor-
porations, are gaining influence and control over lawyers' practices at a
scope significantly above and beyond what had been customary in the past.
112. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.2(a) (scope of representation); 1.6 (confi-
dentiality); 1.7 (concurrent conflicts of interest); 1.8(a) (business transactions with clients); & 1.9 (for-
mer clients).
113. Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv, Privatizing Professionalism: Client Control of Lawyers'
Ethics, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 2577, 2578 (2012).
114. Id.
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In particular, norms relating to lawyers' practice that had formerly been
under the domain of professional and state bodies, or left to the discretion of
lawyers and their firms, are increasingly incorporated into "guidelines,"
"procedures," "codes of conduct," "manuals," or "best practices" memo-
randa, which lawyers are expected to follow. (Emphasis added)."'5
Whelan & Ziv's article shows that ethical obligations of law firms are
increasingly becoming a matter of agreement between lawyers and clients.
This development provides support for our "contractarian" approach, par-
ticularly in ICA, which is a matter of agreement between sophisticated
parties.
Finally, establishment of the ethics rules governing ICA Lawyers by
agreement is practical. The IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Inter-
national Arbitration are widely adopted by agreement of the parties.16
With certain modifications discussed in the next section, this model can be
used for ethical obligations of lawyers in ICA.'17
B. The Contractarian Approach to Determining the Governing Ethics
Rules in ICA: the Six Steps
The contractarian approach that we advocate has six steps:
1. The Parties may specify in their arbitration agreement the rules of
ethics that govern their arbitration. Such a specification could be quite
general (for example: "The New York Rules of Professional Conduct ex-
clusive of Rule 8.5 shall apply to this arbitration.") or it could be quite
precise detailing the specific ethical obligations that would apply (for exam-
ple, "The following New York Rules of Professional Conduct shall apply to
this arbitration: . . .") Parties should be free to chose the applicable set of
ethics rules or specific rules applicable to the arbitration so long as their
choice is not clearly unreasonable."'s
The contractarian approach is fully consistent with the development of
codes of conduct to govern ICA Lawyers as recommended by Professor
Rogers and other scholars. The parties could incorporate by reference a
set of ethics rules that had already been prepared by some organization
(e.g., the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbi-
tration) or by a scholar.
115. Id. at 2578-79.
116. See supra text accompanying note 105.
117. See supra text accompanying note 100. Mr. Benson's idea of an ethics checklist goes in the
same line as our proposal, except that our proposal is more efficient because while in his proposal the
agreement of the parties on ethics rules should intervene immediately before the start of the arbitration
proceeding, in our model the agreement is anticipated at the time of the contract formation and while
in Benson's proposal the agreement has to happen rule by rule, in our model parties may simply choose
one entire set of ethics rules.
118. The reasonable connection is required-at least in case an American ICA Lawyer-to justify
the "reasonable belief." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 8.5(b)(2) ("Disciplinary Author-
ity; Choice of Law") (2012). See also infra Part VI.
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2. In the absence of selection by the parties of a specific set of ethics
rules to govern the arbitration, if the arbitration agreement selects an arbi-
tration provider that has adopted a set of ethical rules, then those rules
apply to the arbitration.
3. If the provider chosen by the agreement has not adopted a set of
ethics rules or if no provider is chosen, but the agreement contains a choice
of law clause, then the ethics rules that apply will be the ethics rules of the
jurisdiction whose law was chosen. If the agreement provides for the law of
several jurisdictions, then the ethics rules of the jurisdiction whose law gov-
erns the predominant number of issues in the case shall apply.
4. If neither 1, 2, nor 3 applies, then the ethics rules that govern shall
be the rules of the jurisdiction whose law controls the predominant number
of issues in the case as determined by the arbitrators using conflict of law
principles.
5. In any case not covered by the first four principles (e.g., when the
parties have agreed that the arbitration should be decided by general mer-
cantile law or UNIDROIT principles or similar references) or in cases not
covered by the relevant body of ethics rules, the necessary ethics rules
should be determined by the arbitrators, either by general order adopting a
set of ethics standards or by order dealing with specific issues either on
motion of either party or on the arbitrators' own motion. Arbitrators
should select a reasonable set of rules, either followed in a jurisdiction,
adopted by a reputable international organization, or advocated by a
scholar.119
6. Once a set of ethics rules is identified pursuant to this "con-
tractarian" method, the domestic ethics rules different from the identified
set of rules should not be applicable to ICA Lawyers. An ICA Lawyer
who complied with the rules so identified should not be sanctioned for vio-
lation of an ethics rule of the jurisdiction in which he or she is admitted or
in the jurisdiction where the arbitration occurs, when there is no violation
of the identified set of rules. This last step is, of course, dependent on the
actions of national authorities of the home and host jurisdictions of the
ICA Lawyer. We would hope that national authorities would conclude that
ICA Lawyers should not be subject to discipline for following a reasonable
set of ethics rules, even if those rules are different from those of the host
jurisdiction or the lawyer's home jurisdiction, either as a matter of defer-
ence to arbitration, comity, or efficient use of resources. In the next section
(Part VI), we explain why in the U.S. Rule 8.5(b)(2), properly interpreted,
should bar domestic authorities from discipline of ICA Lawyers who com-
ply with the ethics rule chosen by the parties. Disciplinary authorities of
home or host countries would retain authority to take disciplinary action
against an ICA Lawyer in extreme cases, for example bribery of an
arbitrator.
119. This is required for the same reason why the parties should choose a set of rules that has a
reasonable relationship to the arbitration as explained in the preceding footnote.
2013] 313
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VI. IS THE CONTRACTARIAN APPROACH PERMISSIBLE UNDER
MODEL RULE 8.5?
The ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission had the opportunity to modify
Rule 8.5 to provide guidance to U.S. lawyers engaged in ICA. The Com-
mission had a Working Group on Uniformity, Choice of Law, and Conflicts
of Interest ("Working Group"), which considered a number of ethics issues
arising from the globalization of the practice of law.1 20  The Working
Group concluded that "Lawyers need clearer guidance when they engage in
cross-border practice and encounter rules of professional conduct that im-
pose conflicting obligation. For this reason, the Commission seeks input into
whether amendments to Model Rule 8.5 or other action would be advisable
False."1 2 1
The Working Group considered three possible solutions, one submit-
ted by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, one by Profes-
sors Laurel Terry and Catherine Rogers, and one coming from the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which "contains an
extended discussion of choice of law considerations and proposes the fol-
lowing approach, which could be reflected in Model Rule 8.5 and its com-
ments." 122 In the end, however, the Commission chose not to address the
issue of modification of Rule 8.5 or to recommend any changes in the com-
ments to the rule, except for the amendment to comment 5 on the specific
point of conflict of interest, discussed above.12 3
While the 20/20 Commission chose not to modify Rule 8.5 or its com-
ments to deal with the determination of applicable ethics rules in ICA, we
believe that our contractarian approach is consistent with the current ver-
sion of ABA Model Rule 8.5(b). Rule 8.5(b) provides: "In any exercise of
120. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, Working Group on Uniformity, Issues Paper: Choice of
Law in Cross-Border Practice (January 18, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/2011_build/gpsolo/choice of law incross.border.practice.authcheckdam.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 26, 2013).
121. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 7.
123. On March 1, 2013, one of the coauthors (Francesca Giannoni-Crystal)-while a speaker at
the Symposium Ethics 20/20-The Future of Professional Responsibility (organized by the Mississippi
College Law Review in Jackson. Mississippi), to present this paper-had an opportunity to exchange
some thoughts with Ellyn S. Rosen, Senior Lead Counsel, Ethics 20/20 Commission, who delivered the
keynote speech. Ms. Rosen explained that the Commission considered with attention the report of the
Working Group on Uniformity, Choice of Law, and Conflicts of Interest and the comments received on
that report. Following the "minimalist" approach that the Commission had adopted at its inception, the
Commission resolved to take action only on the specific point of conflict of interest; from the comments
received, the Commission decided that conflicts of interest were the most urgent area to be clarified.
The Commission, however, did not disagree with the conclusion of the Working Group on the necessity
for clarification of other cross-borders rules; it was a matter of prioritization. The Commission felt that
conflicts of interest were a priority. other areas of cross-border practice were not. Ms. Rosen confirmed
that the Commission evaluated the topic of arbitration with interest. In response to a specific question,
in Mrs. Giannoni-Crystal's understanding, Ms. Rosen agreed that Rule 8.5(b)(2) could be applied to the
situation of international arbitration and that the new addition to comment [5] on conflicts of interest
could be used as a persuasive authority to justify the contractarian proposal of this paper. Ms. Rosen
was speaking in her personal capacity. not on behalf of the Commission.
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the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional con-
duct to be applied shall be as follows . . . ." (emphasis added). Pursuant to
this language, the rule only applies to the exercise of disciplinary authority
by the lawyer's home jurisdiction. Nothing in the rule would prevent par-
ties from agreeing on the ethics rules that would apply in a proceeding
before an international arbitration panel because that panel is not exercis-
ing disciplinary authority of any jurisdiction. Rule 8.5 would intervene only
at a later stage, i.e. if an ethics complaint is raised against an ICA Lawyer.
Suppose a complaint is leveled against a lawyer for complying with the
ethics rules determined under the contractarian approach because the law-
yer's conduct, although permitted by the contractually chosen rules, vio-
lates the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. In this case,
Rule 8.5(b) (or the equivalent in the state) would apply. How would the
rule apply in this setting? We think that the disciplinary authority should
make the following analysis:
(1) Rule 8.5(b)(1) does not apply because the jurisdiction in
which the tribunal "sits" is either unclear or arbitrary with
regard to ethics conduct. 12 4
(2) Under Rule 8.5(b)(2) in an international arbitration the
predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct is also
unclear.125
(3) Therefore, the last sentence of 8.5(b)(2) should govern
what rules would apply in a disciplinary proceeding. When
the parties have chosen a set of ethics rules under the con-
tractarian approach, and where the lawyers in the proceed-
ing have followed those rules, the lawyer has a reasonable
belief that the predominant effect will be in the jurisdiction
whose ethics rules were chosen, so long as that jurisdiction
has a reasonable relationship to the proceeding. Indeed, the
ABA in its recent amendment to comment [5] to Rule 8.5
has used similar reasoning to support the contractarian ap-
proach with regard to the issue of choice of law regarding
conflicts of interest.
An additional argument for the contractarian approach that we pro-
pose can be based on the principle of comity by disciplinary authorities to
international arbitration. Parties to an ICA have the right to choose the
substantive law governing their arbitration: "The right of parties to them-
selves identify the law to apply and the obligation on arbitrators to respect
124. See supra section 111(D).
125. See id.
315
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
that choice is the one overwhelming and truly international conflict of laws
rule which [sic] has developed in international commercial arbitration." 126
Similarly, parties have the right to determine the procedural rules ap-
plicable to the arbitration. The basic international treaty governing arbitra-
tion is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, commonly called the "New York Convention." 127 Be-
cause there is no general international treaty for enforcement of judg-
ments, the New York Convention, which entered into force in 1959, has
been a powerful force in the development of international arbitration.
Article V of the New York Convention provides that a Contracting
state may refuse to enforce an arbitral award rendered in another state on
very limited grounds, one of which is that: "The composition of the arbitral
authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement
of the parties . . ." (emphasis added).12 8
Thus, in international commercial arbitration, with few limits, the par-
ties have the right to choose both the substantive law and the procedural
rules governing the arbitration. Therefore, it should not matter whether
ethics rules are considered as procedural or substantive; in either case the
parties should be free to determine the applicable rules by agreement.
Of course, a disciplinary action against a lawyer involved in ICA is not
an enforcement of an arbitration award so the New York Convention is not
strictly applicable to such a proceeding, and a disciplinary body is not
bound to follow any agreement of the parties regarding arbitration. None-
theless, the contractual foundations of ICA are so fundamental 29 that a
disciplinary body, in exercising its authority, should take this factor into
account. The most direct way of doing so is as a matter of comity. A disci-
plinary body can refuse to entertain proceedings against an ICA Lawyer
when the lawyer's conduct it in accord with the contractually agreed upon
ethics rules governing the proceeding.130
An indirect way for a disciplinary body to apply the parties' agreement
to adopt a certain set of ethical rules is by interpreting the "predominant
126. Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators' Duty to Respect the Parties' Choice of Law in Commercial
Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 59, 59 n. 2 (2006) (quoting Julian D. M. Lew, APPLICABLE LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 69 (1978)).
127. 1958-Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-the
"New York" Convention, UNCITRAL, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral-texts/
arbitration/NYConvention.Htmi (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
128. See id. for the text of the Convention.
129. See Supreme Court cases cited in note 110 supra.
130. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (the
US Supreme Court has recognized the concept of comity in international arbitration when it stated
"[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transna-
tional tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.").
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effect" of the lawyers' conduct under Rule 8.5(b) as occurring in the juris-
diction whose ethics rules were chosen under the contractarian approach
that we advocate. 3 1
VII. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL FOR REVISION TO THE COMMENTS
TO MODEL RULE 8.5
The need for a set of ethics standards to govern lawyers in interna-
tional commercial arbitrations is substantial. The absence of such stan-
dards runs the risk of undermining the legitimacy of such proceedings. The
idea of a special set of ethical standards tailored to international commer-
cial arbitration is appealing, but the practical problem is that it may be
difficult if not impossible to agree on such a set of standards. At best the
development of such a code is a long time away. What is needed now is an
approach with the following characteristics:
* It must be practical to implement;
* It must be reasonably clear;
* It must provide for a level playing field in which the lawyers are
subject to the same set of standards;
* It must solve (or at least diminish) the "double deontology" prob-
lem of subjecting lawyers that adhere to these standards to disci-
pline in the jurisdictions where they are admitted;
* It must be reasonably acceptable to national disciplinary
authorities.
We believe that the contractarian approach advocated in this article
meets these requirements. Moreover, it provides a path for the develop-
ment of an international code of ethics like the one favored by many schol-
ars because it allows parties or arbitrators to adopt proposed codes to
govern their proceedings, thus creating a body of experience that can help
refine these codes.
The ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission decided not to revise either Model
Rule 8.5 or its comments to deal with the issue of determining what ethics
rules apply to ICA. The Commission has finished its work, but the issue
remains. Other sections of the ABA have in the past proposed changes in
the Model Rules to the ABA House of Delegates, and this method for
revision of Rule 8.5 could still be used. For example, either the Section of
International Law or the Section of Litigation would be natural candidates
to propose such a revision. In our opinion, only a modest change in the
131. Not every jurisdiction in the U.S. has adopted Model Rule 8.5(b) in the version that we have
discussed. For example, New York has a nonuniform version of Rule 8.5. See supra note 90. Under the
New York rule, "predominant effect" analysis is only used if the lawyer is licensed to practice in more
than one jurisdiction. If the lawyer is licensed only in New York, New York rules govern the lawyer's
conduct. Therefore, if a New York lawyer was the target of a disciplinary proceeding in connection
with an ICA and the lawyer followed a contractually agreed on set of ethics rules that differed from the
New York rules, the predominant effect analysis discussed in the text would not apply. However, New
York disciplinary authorities could as a matter of comity refuse to entertain such a proceeding if the
lawyer's conduct conformed to a contractually agreed on reasonable set of ethics rules. The comity
argument can be used whatever version of Rule 8.5(b) is adopted in the jurisdiction.
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comments to Rule 8.5 would be necessary to clarify which rules apply in
ICA. We offer the following addition to comment 7 for consideration by
the ABA:
In international arbitrations, the place where the tribunal
"sits," the place where a lawyer's conduct occurs, and the
location of the predominant effect of a lawyer's conduct
may all be unclear. A lawyer engaged in an international
arbitration should not be subject to discipline if the lawyer
follows ethics rules agreed upon by the parties or orders es-
tablished by an arbitration tribunal. The agreement be-
tween the parties may be explicit or may be inferred from a
choice-of-law agreement by the parties.
